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Conscientious Objection and International Law:
A Human Right?
by Marie-France Major*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Second World War, concern for the legal and social protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms has taken increasingly
manifest forms. At the national and international level, there has been
increased recognition that certain basic humanitarian guarantees must
receive protection.1 In contemporary society, respect for human rights is
an important element of political legitimacy.2
"One of the main purposes of the concern for human rights is to
ensure that divergent opinions can be accommodated, respected and ac-
ted upon in such a way that due attention is paid both to the common
good and to the concerns of individuals."' The characterization of a spe-
cific goal as a human right is of the utmost importance since it "elevates
it above the rank and file of competing social goals, gives it a degree of
immunity from challenge and generally endows it with an aura of time-
lessness, absoluteness and universal validity."4
Whenever claims are made for the recognition of new fundamental
rights:
[t]he challenge is to achieve an appropriate balance between, on the
one hand, the need to maintain the integrity and credibility of the
human rights tradition, and on the other hand, the need to adopt a
dynamic approach that fully reflects changing needs and perspectives
* B.Sc.Soc. (OHAWA), LL.B. (OHAWA), B.C.L. Oxford; J.S.D. University of California at
Berkeley (in progress).
I See generally DETLEv F. VAGTS & DAVID WEISSBRODT, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1989) (discussing the history of post World War
II efforts to secure human rights to all, with emphasis on the role of the United States); Lloyd Cutler,
The Internationalization of Human Rights, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 575 (tracing the historical accept-
ance of human rights with emphasis on consequences in various countries).
2 See generally NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF
MAN (Jeremy Waldon ed., 1987) [hereinafter NONSENSE UPON STILTS]; Anthony D'Amato, The
Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110 (1982).
3 Asbjorn Eide & Chama Mubanga-Chipoya, Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N.
ESCOR, Sub-Comm. on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, at 4, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1983/30/Rev. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Conscientious Objection].
4 Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development,
1 HARv. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3, 3 (1988).
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and responds to the emergence of new threats to human dignity and
well-being.5
It is in the perspective of such a balance that the issue of conscientious
objection to military service should be examined.
II. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
Initially, one must understand that conscientious objection does not
simply refer to a person's refusal to bear arms in time of war. The ex-
pression can also apply to a variety of situations in which an individual
decides to follow the dictates of his conscience instead of the collective
interest of society. As recent events have again demonstrated, however,
the most dramatic, and perhaps the most complex, form of conscientious
objection relates to military service.
Conscience can be defined as a genuine ethical conviction, whether
of religious or humanist inspiration, which is supported by a variety of
sources.6 As was stated in United States v. Nordlof,7 conscience is a
"moral judgment that prohibits the violation of a previously recognized
ethical principle."8 Conscientious beliefs are said to reflect "an individ-
ual's inward conviction of what is morally right or morally wrong, and it
is a conviction that is genuinely reached and held after some process of
thinking about the subject."9 In all situations, conscientious refusal can
be characterized as "noncompliance with a more or less direct legal in-
junction or administrative order."" °
The right to refuse to participate in war because of individual con-
victions, requires an examination of the degree to which an individual
should be entitled to take responsibility for his convictions. Because the
refusal to participate in war is not only a matter of opinion, but also of
conscience, the question in cases of objection to military service is
whether a state should purposely violate the conscience of individuals.
The conscience of the individual is a precious asset for every society. It
is part of the socialization process to nurture and encourage the moral
conscience of the individual, without which civilization would be
meaningless. At the center of this process is the effort to instill in the
individual the conviction that it is immoral in most circumstances to
5 Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 607, 609 (1984) [hereinafter Conjuring Up New Human Rights].
6 NONSENSE UPON STILTS, supra note 2, at 3.
7 440 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1971).
8 Id. at 843.
9 Norman S. Rearburn, Conscientious Objection and the Particular War, 43 AUSTL. L. J. 317,
319 (1969) (citing Grundal v. Minister of State for Labor and National Service, Supreme Court of
Western Australia, unreported judgment, 11th September 1953).
10 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JuSTIcE 368 (1971).
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take the life of other persons. 1
In all societies, individuals should be entitled to take responsibility for
their convictions. The decision not to participate in war needs to be
respected, for the moral revulsion of the convinced conscientious objec-
tor at the thought of taking human life is great. Military conscription of
such men necessarily entails grave interference with conscience." 12 Fur-
ther, when a state exempts those whose convictions do not permit them
to participate in war, it reaffirms its adherence to the principles of indi-
vidual and religious liberty.1 3
More importantly, in the case of military service, an individual is
not merely prohibited from acting in accordance with his convictions,
but rather he is compelled to perform an affirmative act which goes
against his convictions.1 4
There may be and probably is a very radical distinction between com-
pelling a citizen to refrain from acts which he regards as moral but
which the majority of his fellow citizens and the law regard as immoral
or unwholesome to the life of the state on the one hand, and compel-
ling him on the other to do affirmative acts which he regards as uncon-
scientious and immoral.... [T]he former does not in most instances
which are likely to occur do violence to his conscience; but conscience
is violated if he is coerced into doing an act which is opposed to his
deepest convictions of right and wrong.... However rigorous the
state may be in repressing the commission of acts which are regarded
as injurious to the state, it may well stay its hand before it compels the
commission of acts which violate the conscience.1 5
Because the individual is compelled to commit the ultimate act of killing
another human being, governments must recognize the right of conscien-
tious objection in the case of military service.
III. THE PROTECTION OF CONSCIENCE
Once the right to conscientious objection to military service has
been accepted, the next question to be addressed is the range of grounds
11 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 3.
12 Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80
HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1412 (1967).
13 See RAws, supra note 10, at 382. See also United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D.
Mass. 1969). "[E]very man shares and society as a whole shares an interest in the liberty of the
conscientious objector, religious or not.... Society's own stability and growth, its physical and
spiritual prosperity are responsive to the liberties of its citizens, to their deepest insights, to their free
choices .... " Id. at 908.
14 See generally Theodore Hochstadt, Right to Exemption from Military Service of a Conscien-
tious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1967); Russell Wolff, Conscien-
tious Objection: Time for Recognition as a Fundamental Human Right, 6 ASILS INT'L L.J. 65
(1982).
Is H.F. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. Q. 253, 268 (1919).
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on which objection will be permitted. At present there does not exist, in
the international community, any agreement on the scope of convictions
that should be protected. Many countries recognize a pacifist objection
to military service if an individual believes that it is wrong under all cir-
cumstances to kill. However, many countries do not recognize that the
objection to the use of force can be valid in some circumstances but not
in others.16 Thus, "the nature of the beliefs that are required to obtain
conscientious objector status" play an important role.17
For some individuals, the killing of another human being is immoral
under all circumstances. These individuals are absolutely opposed to any
participation in war. This position is based either on religious judgments
or feelings of conscience which dictate that human life should be revered
and should never be terminated. 8 Although religion and conscience are
not synonymous, the right to conscientious objection must be recognized
so long as individuals possess a sincere conviction that human life is
sacred. 19
For other individuals, the opposition to war is based on political
ideals or is simply founded on the notion that armed force can only be
justified under limited circumstances not found in the context of a partic-
ular war engaged in by the national authority.2" This objection can be
based on a violation of the standards of national or international law, or
of the principles of morality.2 '
The idea that war can be morally acceptable only in certain circum-
stances emanates from the concept of just war as developed by Christian
theologians.22 According to St. Augustine, it was morally justifiable to
engage in war whenever this was done in defense of a just state against
invaders.2" This theory put forward moral conditions for waging war
16 For a survey of the acceptance by the international community of the right to conscien-
tiously object to military service, see Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 1; Patricia Schaffer &
David Weissbrodt, Conscientious Objection to Military Service As a Human Right, 9 REv. INT'L
COMM'N JURISTS 33 (1972); Report of the Secretary-General to the Commission on Human Rights:
U.N. ESCOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1118/ Corr.1 & Add.1-3 (1982).
17 Wolff, supra note 14, at 69.
18 See generally Note, Conscientious Objectors: Recent Developments and a New Appraisal, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 1434 (1970).
19 Wolff, supra note 14, at 69-70. See generally, David M. Cohen & Robert Greenspan, Con-
scientious Objection, Democratic Theory, and the Constitution, 29 U. PITr. L. REV. 389 (1968).
20 See generally H. Patrick Sweeney, Selective Conscientious Objection: The Practical Moral
Alternative to Killing, 1 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 113 (1968).
21 Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in International Law, 33
AM. J. INT'L L. 665, 667-670 (1939).
22 Id. at 669.
23 According to D.S. Sax, some of the criteria necessary to establish the existence of a just war
included the following:
1. The war must have a just cause, i.e. it must be waged in defense of a country or else
(some added) to right a wrong one state has inflicted on another.
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which were intended to apply to individuals as well as nations.2 4
Despite this long standing concept of just war, the right to partial
objection to military service has not yet received world-wide acceptance.
One reason for such reluctance is the fact that when an individual refuses
to participate in a specific war he is in essence asserting the illegality of
its purpose or of the means and methods used in combat by the state."
States do not want to admit that they could be acting illegally. Further,
any objection to the war that is expressed by an individual is viewed as a
criticism of the policies of the government. Consequently, states gener-
ally assert that it is the nation, rather than the individual citizen, who
must decide whether a war is morally acceptable or not.26
The refusal to take part in all war under any conditions is an un-
worldly view bound to remain a sectarian doctrine. It no more chal-
lenges the state's authority than the celibacy of priests challenges the
sanctity of marriage. By exempting pacifists from its prescriptions the
state may even seem to display a certain magnanimity. But conscien-
tious refusal based upon the principles of justice between peoples as
they apply to particular conflict is another matter. For such refusal is
an affront to the government's pretensions, and when it becomes wide-
spread, the continuation of an unjust war may prove impossible.27
2. The motive of those who wage it must be justice, not revenge or hatred.
3. The legally constituted ruler of the land, not any leader of a mob, must declare the
war.
4. It must be a last resort, after every other way to settle the conflict has been tried and
has failed.
5. There must be a reasonable prospect of victory, lest people kill and are killed to no
avail.
6. The cost must be calculated as carefully as possible, and the suffering the war will
entail must not be disproportionately large in relation to its aims.
7. The war must be waged by just means without unnecessary violence or cruelty.
8. The combatants must not harm or rob innocent non-combatants (specifically farmers,
women, children, clergy).
9. The peace that will ensue must be a just one.
D.S. Sax, The Just War and Situational Objection, in CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION (Center for Inter-
group Studies, Occasional Paper No. 8, 1984). See also Kent Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All The
Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 31 (1971).
24 See generally J. CHILDRESS, JUST-WAR THEORIES (1978); J.T. JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRA-
DITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY (1981); WILLIAM V.
O'BRIAN, THE CONDUCT OF A JUST AND LIMITED WAR (1981) [hereinafter THE CONDUCT OF
JUST AND LIMITED WAR]; PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY (1968); PAUL RAMSEY, WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE: How SHALL MODERN WAR
BE CONDUCTED JUSTLY? (1961) [hereinafter WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE]; JOAN D.
TOOKE, THE JUST WAR IN AQUINAS AND GROTIUS (1965); ROBERT TUCKER, THE JUST WAR
(1960); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977) Inis L. Claude Jr., Just Wars: Doc-
trines and Institutions, 95 POL. Scd. Q. 83 (1980); von Elbe, supra note 21.
25 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 6.
26 Note, supra, note 18, at 1437.
27 RAwLS, supra note 10, at 382.
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A second argument for the non-recognition of partial objectors is
that it would have a deleterious effect on national morale in war time if
persons who did not agree with the political objectives of their govern-
ment were excused from military service.2
Another rationale is that it is more difficult to prevent fraudulent
exemptions of partial objectors than it is with respect to total objectors.29
There is a danger that more false claims will be presented if the exception
is extended to partial objectors because of the difficulty of disproving the
objectors' motives. It is also argued that if partial objection were ac-
cepted, the number of people in the forces would be drastically reduced
and therefore nations recognizing such a right would no longer be able to
defend themselves.30
These arguments can be easily countered. The conscientious objec-
tor can fulfill his duty to the state through alternative service, which can
be for the same length of time as service in the armed forces. Thus soci-
ety can not view the objector as avoiding his duty. Further, this will
assure that there is no incentive for false claims to be brought forward.
Experience has shown that in those countries which do permit conscien-
tious objection, only a limited number of individuals claim such status,
leaving the armed forces with more than sufficient manpower to defend
the country. 31 There is, therefore, no valid reason why the right to par-
tial objection should not be recognized. 2 As is argued by Wolff, "the
protection sought for rights of conscience applies no less forcefully when
an individual's beliefs dictate the need to abstain from specific combat
than when all war is broadly condemned. 33
This view is reinforced by the position adopted in some recent inter-
national resolutions and studies that deal with the question of conscien-
tious objection. Eide and Mubanga-Chipoya, in their report to the
United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, argued that the pacifist position was not the
only form of conscientious objection that should be recognized. "Objec-
tion to participation in military service could also be partial, that is re-
lated to the purposes of or means used in armed action."' 34 In 1978, the
United Nations General Assembly accepted the notion of partial objec-
tion when it recognized the right to "refuse service in military or police
28 Giannella, supra note 12, at 1416.
29 Hochstadt, supra note 14, at 15.
30 Greenawalt, supra note 23, at 48-50.
31 See Schaffer, supra note 16, at 52.
32 For a similar point of view, see generally, A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES, THE CASE FOR
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION (James Finn ed., 1968).
33 Wolff, supra note 14, at 70.
34 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 3.
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forces which are used to enforce apartheid."3 Amnesty International
also affirmed that a conscientious objector is:
a person liable to conscription for military service, or to register for
conscription for military service (even where there is no military ser-
vice), who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising
from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical, political or
similar motives refuses to perform armed service or any other direct or
indirect participation in wars or armed conflicts.?
Although the right to partial objection is not universally accepted,37
it needs to be recognized as a protected right. As long as the reason for
the partial objection falls within one of the defined categories on which
such objection can be based, the national authorities must recognize as
valid the claim of the objector. For, once it is accepted that the right to
conscientious objection is necessary to protect the right of persons to act
according to their conscience, there seems no reason to differentiate be-
tween those whose convictions are based on religious principles and those
who base their convictions on political ideas or ideals. In cases of total or
partial objection the same feelings of sincerity and conviction exist.3 8 It
can even be argued that a partial conscientious objector, because he has
been forced to make a discriminating study of the problem, has a deeper
understanding of the issues than does a total objector.3 9
35 G.A. Res. 33/165, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1978).
36 Amnesty International, Policy Guidelines on Conscientious Objection, at 1, reprinted in The
Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, including the Question of Consci-
entious Objection to Military Service, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/25 (1984).
37 See, for example, Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1987/46, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd
Sess., Supp. No. 5, at 108-109, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1987/60 (1987), where the Commission recog-
nizes that "conscientious objection to military service derives from principles and reasons of con-
science, including profound convictions, arising from religious, ethical, moral or similar motives".
The Council of Europe similarly maintains that "anyone liable to conscription for military service
who, for compelling reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall have the
right to be released from the obligations to perform such service". Committee of Ministers Recom-
mendation No. R (87) 8, Communication on the Activities of the Committee of Ministers, Eur. Parl.
Ass., 39th Sess., Doc. 5725, at 10 (1987), reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTION OF REC-
OMMENDATIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE COMMITrEE OF MINISTERS CON-
CERNING HUMAN RGHTS 1949-1987, at 184-185 (1989).
In its explanatory report, the Committee asserts that "only reasons involving a conflict of con-
science can be taken into consideration and such reasons must, moreover, be "compelling" i.e. im-
possible to resist. It should be noted that the recommendation does not cover cases of so-called
"selective" or "partial" objections of conscience that is, those limited to the use of arms in certain
cases only." Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Including the Question
of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Agenda
Item 15, at 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1989/30 (1989) at 24.
38 See Ruth C. Silva, The Constitution, the Conscientious Objector, and the "Just" War, 75
DICK. L. REv. 1, 9-15 (1970).
39 See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Mass. 1969).
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In a democracy, it seems necessary that individuals be allowed to
criticize and object to the actions of their government. "Given the often
predatory aims of state power, and the tendency of men to defer to their
government's decision to wage war, a general willingness to resist the
state's claims is all the more necessary."''
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHT OF CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION TO MILITARY SERVICE
A. International Standards
A number of international legal principles implicitly support the
right to conscientiously object to military service. Among these princi-
ples are the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the
right to life and the right to peace.
Rules of conduct that circumscribe participation in war, include the
theories of jus contra bellum andjus in bello, the condemnation of geno-
cide and the right of countries to self-determination. These standards
will now be examined more closely because they support the contention
that the right of conscientious objection is, or should be recognized as, a
basic human right.
1. Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
The first international standard on which the right to conscien-
tiously object to military service can be founded is the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. Many international conventions assert
that everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and religion and
that such freedom includes the right to manifest one's belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.41 Such conventions include the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,4 2 the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,43 the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,' 4 the American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man,45 the American Convention on Human Rights,46 and
40 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 382.
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
42 Id.
43 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
44 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9,
213 U.N.T.S. 222, 230.
45 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, Final Act of the Ninth
International Conference of American States (Bogota, May 1948), art. III, INTER-AMERICAN COM-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, O.A.S. OFF. REC., OEA/Ser. L.V./11.71 Doc. 6 (English) Rev. 1, at 15, 19
(1988).
46 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 12, INTER-AMERICAN COM-
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the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.47
The question then becomes whether there is a basis for claiming ex-
emption to military service on the grounds that freedom of conscience
and religion are protected rights. For, as was explained above, when an
individual is asserting the right to object to military service, he is in es-
sence exercising a right to freedom of conscience.48 The United Nations
Commission on Human Rights answers this question in the affirmative.
A 1989 resolution states that the Commission:
Recognizing that conscientious objection to military service derives
from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convic-
tions arising from religious, ethical, moral or similar motives,
1. Recognizes the right of everyone to have conscientious objections
to military service as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion as laid down in article 18 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights as well as article 18 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.49
The resolution specifically recognizes that objection to military service on
conscientious grounds is a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of
conscience.
Problems arise, however, when the right to conscientiously object to
military service is based on Article 18 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.50 During the debates on the adoption of Arti-
cle 18, the Philippines delegation proposed an additional paragraph to
the Convention which stated that "[p]ersons who conscientiously object
to war as being contrary to their religion shall be exempt from military
service.""1 This amendment, however, was withdrawn prior to a vote on
the issue.52 There is, therefore, some controversy on whether the drafts-
men intended to include the right to conscientiously object to military
service within the notion of freedom of religion and conscience.
Another obstacle is the fact that Article 8, Paragraph 3(c) of the
Convention provides that "forced or compulsory labor" shall not include
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM, O.A.S. OFF. REc., OEA/Ser. L.V./11.71 Doc. 6 (English) Rev. 1, at 25,
(1988).
47 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 8, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982). [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
48 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
49 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, Draft Report of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/L.10/Add. 15 (1989).
50 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 43.
51 U.N. ESCOR, Human Rts. Comm., 6th Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/353/SR.161
(1950). An argument can be made that the reason why the proposed addition to Article 18 was
withdrawn is simply that its inclusion was unnecessary in light of the fact that Article 18 already
covered the matter.
52 Id. at 12.
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"any service of a military character and, in countries where conscientious
objection is recognized, any national service required by law of conscien-
tious objectors. '5 3 This article seems to accept the idea that individual
countries may decide whether or not they will grant a right of conscien-
tious objection since it speaks in terms of "where conscientious objection
is recognized.154 This interpretation is also consistent with the decisions
of the U.N. Human Rights Committee.
The Committee first examined the case of a Finnish citizen who
claimed that Finland had breached Articles 18 and 19 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" by refusing to recognize
his status as a conscientious objector and by subjecting him to criminal
prosecution because of his refusal to perform military service. 6
The Committee first noted that the complainant "was not prose-
cuted and sentenced because of his beliefs or opinions as such, but be-
cause he refused to perform military service."'57 It then concluded that:
[t]he Covenant does not provide for the right to conscientious objec-
tion; neither article 18 nor article 19 of the Covenant, especially taking
into account paragraph 3(c)(ii) of article 8, can be construed as to im-
ply that right.58
Therefore, the Human Rights Committee rejected the communication on
the grounds that it was inadmissible.
The Committee reaffirmed its position in a case which decided
whether a violation of Article 26 could be proven by a citizen of the
Netherlands.59 The Committee observed that "the Covenant does not
preclude the institution of compulsory military service by States parties,
even though this means that the rights of individuals may be restricted
during military service, within the exigencies of such service."' It there-
fore seems clear that Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does not include the right to conscientiously object
to military service.6'
Unlike the Human Rights Commission which mentions, in its reso-
lutions, Articles 18 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
53 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 43, art. 8.
54 Id.
55 Right to Conscientious Objection in Finland, 7 HuM. RTS. L.J. 267 (1986).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 268.
58 Id.
59 See Communication No. 245/1987. U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 265 U.N. Doc. A/43/40, (1988).
60 Id. at 266.
61 See also Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms,
in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
209, 211-212 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS].
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and of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe does not refer, in rec-
ommendation R(87), to Article 9 of the European Convention.62 The
Recommendation simply states that:
anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling
reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall
have the right to be released from the obligation to perform such ser-
vice, on the conditions set out thereafter. Such person may be liable to
perform alternative service.63
No reference was made to Article 9 of the Convention because this would
have presented a conflict with previous committee decisions which held
that Article 9 of the Convention did not assure a right of conscientious
objection."
Although Article 9, at first glance, may appear to grant a right of
conscientious objection, it must be read and interpreted in light of Article
4.65 Article 4(3)(b) makes express reference to conscientious objectors
and provides that, for purposes of that article, the term "forced or com-
pulsory labor" shall not include service exacted from conscientious ob-
jectors instead of compulsory military service in countries where a right
to objection is recognized.66 Since Article 4 speaks of conscientious ob-
jectors "in countries where they are recognized," states are not obliged
under Article 9 to recognize objectors.67 Further, because Article 4 re-
fers to substitute service, a person cannot claim, under Article 9, exemp-
tion from substitute service where the state recognizes his status as a
conscientious objector.6s
The question of the right to conscientious objection to military ser-
vice was examined by the European Commission on Human Rights in
the Grandrath case.69 In that case, a German citizen who was a Bible
62 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 44.
Article 9 provides:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right in-
cludes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
public safety, for the protection of the public order, health or morals, or for the protec-
tion of the rights and freedoms of others.
63 Recommendation R(87)8, supra note 37.
64 Id.
65 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 44, art. 4.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See FRANcIS JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 144-45 (1975).
69 10 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON H.R. 626 (1967).
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study leader in a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, had been recog-
nized by the national authorities as a conscientious objector.70 He was
required to perform substitute civilian service but was given an opportu-
nity to apply for exemption or postponement of such substitute service.71
The national authorities, however, rejected his claim for exemption from
substitute service.72 As a result of his refusal to perform substitute civil-
ian service, proceedings were brought against him, and he was convicted
and sentenced to prison.73 Appearing before the Commission, the appli-
cant alleged breaches of Article 9, because he had not been exempted
from substitute civilian service; and of Article 14, because he was dis-
criminated against by the national authorities where the national law cre-
ated exceptions for Evangelical or Roman Catholic ministers.7 4
The Commission first distinguished the issues of religion and con-
science under Article 9. It stated that the civilian service which the ap-
plicant was required to perform would not restrict his right to manifest
his religion since it would not interfere with the private and personal
practice of his religion, or with his duties to his religious community.75
On the question of conscience, the commission examined Article 4(3)(b)
and held:
[a]s in this provision it is expressly recognized that civilian service may
be imposed on conscientious objectors as a substitute for military ser-
vice, it must be concluded that objections of conscience do not, under
the Convention, entitle a person to exemption from such service.76
The reasoning of the Commission, as explained by Fawcett,7 7 was that:
had there been no reference in Article 4(3)(b) to conscientious objec-
tion to compulsory military service, it could have been argued that,
while such service is not forced labour contrary to Article 4, it is still
contrary to Article 9(1) if imposed on conscientious objectors. But
since Article 4(3)(b) refers to conscientious objection in terms, which
plainly imply that contracting States are not bound to recognize it,
compulsory military service is an exception to Article 9(1) as well as
Article 4. It follows afortiori that substitute civilian service is also an
exception.
78
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 628.
74 Id. at 630.
75 Id. at 672.
76 Id. at 674.
77 J.E.S. FAWCETr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(1987).
78 Id. at 241.
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The Commission also found no breach of Article 14 of the Convention.79
In X v. Austria 80 the Commission once again examined the issue of
conscience and military service. In that case, the applicant, who had
been convicted for refusing to serve in the military, claimed that, as a
Roman Catholic, it was impossible for him to serve as an armed combat-
ant." He therefore alleged before the Commission that his right to free-
dom of conscience had been violated.82
The Commission, in examining the scope of Article 9, held that Ar-
ticle 4(3)(b) had to be taken into consideration. It stated that, "by in-
cluding the words, in countries where they are recognized, in Article
4(3)(b), a choice is left to the High Contracting Parties to the Convention
whether or not to recognize conscientious objectors and, if so recognized,
to provide some substitute service for them.""3 The Commission there-
fore concluded that Article 9, as qualified by Article 4(3)(b), does not
impose on a state an obligation to recognize conscientious objection and
the Convention does not prevent a state which fails to recognize consci-
entious objectors from punishing those who refuse military service.84
As illustrated in these two cases, the Commission has clearly con-
cluded that the right to conscientiously object to military service is not
protected by the European Convention. It must also be noted that in the
case of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
European Convention, the decisions of the courts that freedom of con-
science did not include the right to object to military service, were predi-
cated on the fact that both conventions contained limiting articles.
In conclusion, despite the fact that certain conventions specifically
recognize the right to freedom of conscience, international human rights
tribunals have consistently held that the right to conscientiously object to
military service is not an element of the right to conscience. Accord-
ingly, the international community must broaden the concept of freedom
of conscience to include the right to object to military service.
79 Grandath, 10 Y.B. EUR. CONY. H.R. at 686; The Commission reaffirmed its decision in X.
v. The Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 7705/76 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 196
(1977) and in Johansen v. Norway, Appl. 10600/83, (1987) 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 103 (Commission
Report).
80 43 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 161.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. See also Johansen v. Norway, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep at 106-107; Conscientious Objectors v.
Denmark, App. No. 7565/76, 9 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep 117, 118 (1977) (Commission re-
port); Dec. Adm. Com. App. 7548/76, October 7, 1977, in 3 DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CASE-LAW
RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 374 (1984).
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2. Right to Life
The right to conscientiously object to military service is reinforced
by the fact that the right to life is guaranteed in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights," the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights,86  the European Convention on Human Rights,87  the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,88 and the Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.8 9
Although the right to life is not an absolute right,90 the rule is that
no one should be arbitrarily deprived of his life.91 As Eide and
Mubanga-Chipoya argue:
there may be, in national and international law, a legitimate basis for
taking the life of others when this is not arbitrary. Specific norms to
this effect have been developed in all societies. To deprive a person of
his life is everywhere considered as something that can be justified only
under extreme circumstances and for reasons clearly defined in ad-
vance. This principle forms part of the conscience of every moral per-
son, and it therefore reinforces the conviction that one shall not
participate in the taking of life of others unless there exists an extreme
situation that is clearly justified.92
If the right to life is one of the most important human rights, then it
may also be said that the right to refuse to take a life must be regarded as
a fundamental human right. If national laws and international custom
forbid individuals from engaging in arbitrary killing, conscientious objec-
tors should not be punished for refusing to kill.93 Therefore, the right to
life, liberty and security of person must include within its scope the right
not to be forced to take the life of others.
The relevance of the right to life with regard to the issue of conscien-
tious objection to military service was recognized by the Commission on
85 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 41, art. 3.
86 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 43, art. 6.
87 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 44, art. 2.
88 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 45, art. I.
89 Banjul Charter, supra note 47, art. 4.
90 Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention
on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter, certain
categories of permissible deprivations of the right to life are recognized. See generally C. K. Boyle,
The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 221
(B.G. Ramcharan, ed., 1985) [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO LIFE]; Daniel D. Nserko, Arbitrary Depri-
vation of Life: Controls on Permissible Deprivations, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE, supra at 245.
91 See B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life," in THE RIGHT TO
LIFE, supra note 90; Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 61, at 114.
92 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 5.
93 See Statement of the International Peace Bureau, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 15, at 2, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1989/NGO/71 (1989).
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Human Rights in resolution 1989/59, which states, "Mindful of articles
3 and 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaim
the right to life, liberty and security of person and the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion... we recognize a right of conscien-
tious objection." 94
3. Jus Contra Bellum
Jus Contra bellum refers to that body of international law which
restricts the right to use armed force to certain well defined situations.9"
For example, the United Nations Charter curtails the right of states to
use armed force as an instrument of foreign policy. Article 2, paragraph
4 of the Charter of the United Nations stipulates that "all members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Na-
tions."96 Article 51 of the Charter also establishes that the only justifi-
able use of armed force is for self-defence in the event of an armed attack
on a member state.97
The principles developed in the Charter have been reinforced by a
number of other international instruments such as the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,9" the Dec-
laration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations,99 the Definition of Aggression," °° and the Declara-
tion on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty.10
These instruments establish the principle that the use of armed force
must be limited and, in fact, that it is prohibited in most situations. The
rules developed in these instruments are important to the issue of a right
of conscientious objection because:
when a person is convinced that the armed forces of his own country
94 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, supra note 49.
95 See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE (1988).
96 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
97 Id. art. 51. See generally JAMES LESLIE BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS chaps. IV-V (6th
ed., 1963); Ian Brownlie, The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force, 1945-1985, in THE
CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, at 491 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) [herein-
after THE CURRENT REGULATION]; Bert V.A. R6ling, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N.
Charter, in THE CURRENT REGULATION supra at 3; C.H.M. Waldock, The regulation of the Use of
Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 454 (1952).
98 G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
99 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
100 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Annex, at 143-44, U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add. 1
(1974).
101 G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
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are being used or may be used in the future for purposes that are in
violation of international law, and when therefore a conscience built on
respect for international law reinforces the general repulsion against
taking the life of others arbitrarily, should not this objection be ac-
cepted? This would form a concrete application of the extent of the
right to freedom of conscience and to freedom of action built on
conscience.1
0 2
The Nuremberg Charter raises an additional argument that can be
invoked for the recognition of the right to refuse military service. Article
6 of the Charter establishes in part that:
[t]he following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual
responsibility:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war...
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, exterminations, en-
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population before or during war or persecu-
tions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated. 10
3
The Nuremberg Charter is particularly relevant to the issue of con-
scientious objection since it advances the principle of individual responsi-
bility for the crime of attacking international peace.' 4 In the Nurnberg
Trial, the International Military Tribunal stated:
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of
sovereign States, and provides no punishment for individuals; and fur-
ther, that where the act in question is an act of State, those who carry
it out are not personally responsible but are protected by the doctrine
of the sovereignty of the State. In the opinion of the Tribunal, both
these submissions must be rejected. That international law imposes
duties and liabilities upon individuals as upon States has long been rec-
ognized ... the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedi-
102 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 6.
103 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 286.
104 See generally Anthony D'Amato, et al., War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg De-
fense" and the Military Service Resister, 57 CALIF. L.R. 1055 (1969); Mary M. Kaufman, Judgment
at Nurnberg: An appraisal of Its Significance, 40 GUILD PRAcT. 62 (1983); Frank Lawrence, Note,
The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 397 (1989).
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ence imposed by the individual State. He who violates the law of war
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of
the State, if the State in authorizing action moves outside its compe-
tence under international law.'
0 5
The argument for the conscientious objector is that since he is re-
sponsible under international law for his actions, he should not be forced
to participate in international crimes. If the objector believes that the
armed forces of his country are being used for purposes that violate the
principles of international law, he must be able to object. Further, the
notion of crimes against the peace reinforces the idea that, in interna-
tional law, aggressive and illegal wars should not be supported.
4. Jus in Bello
The principle of jus in bello 106 regulates the means and methods
that a nation can use to wage war."17 A number of international instru-
ments prohibit the use of certain means and methods of warfare.10 8 Un-
acceptable conduct includes the failure to discriminate between
combatants and civilians and between military and civilian targets.' 9
Reference can also be made to Article 6 of the London Charter which
deals with war crimes and crimes against humanity. 110
The guidelines established by the different conventions can be
105 The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).
106 Jus in bello "can be referred to interchangeably as the 'laws of armed conflict' or the 'laws
of War.'" Walter G. Sharp, Sr., The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed
Conflict: A Case Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. Rav. 1, (1992) (citing DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR 1-2 (Adam Roberts & Richards Guelff eds., 1989)).
107 See generally THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR, supra note 24, at 37-70; RALPH
B. POTrER, WAR AND MORAL DISCOURSE (1969); WAR AND THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE, supra
note 24.
108 1977 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 95, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/15.
109 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
110 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, Oct. 6, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]. The Agreement and the Charter are collectively re-
ferred to as the London Charter. Article VI defines war crimes as:
[Miurder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose the civilian
population of or in an occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the scene, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Id. art. VI, 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 287-88. Crimes against humanity are defined as:
[Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during war; or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpe-
trated ....
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viewed as drawing the "line between protection of the life of the individ-
ual and the legitimate scope of action when the use of armed force is
unavoidable." ' These guidelines play an important role in the debate
concerning the right to conscientiously object to military service since an
individual can argue that he should be able to object to participation in
an action that goes beyond a legitimate armed action.
5. Nuclear Weapons
Because of the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used in the
context of war, it can be argued that "a youth may refuse to take part in
military preparations for such a war on the ground that it would neces-
sarily violate the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1929 and 1949, the customary international law of warfare,
and every tenet of morality and rationality."' t 12
Since international law has recognized that under certain circum-
stances there is a duty to refuse to take part in armed combat or to par-
ticipate in certain prohibited actions,113 a right to object to military
service in these situations is a prerequisite to the implementation of that
duty. 114
6. Genocide
Following the adoption of a 1946 General Assembly resolution af-
firming the principles of the Nurenberg Charter,1 15 the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide was adopted in 1948."6 In
Article 1 of the Convention, the parties confirm that genocide "is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent and to pun-
ish." ' 1 7 Article 2 defines genocide as acts "committed with intent to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or religious group, as
such."' 18 These acts include killing members of the group, causing seri-
ous bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately in-
111 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 6.
112 Schaffer, supra, note 16, at 38. See also, JUST WAR THEORY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (John
D. Jones & Marc Griesbach eds., 1985).
113 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3.
114 See generally The Role of Youth in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, In-
cluding the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military Service, U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 45th Sess., Agenda Item 15, at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/NGO/18 (1989).
115 G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946).
116 G.A. Res. 260, U.N. Doc. A/760 & A/760/Corr. 2, at 810 (1948).
117 Id. art. I.
118 Id. art. II. On the question of genocide, see also IRVING Louis HOROWITz, GENOCIDE:
STATE POWER AND MASS MURDER (2nd ed., 1977); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CON-
VENTION: ITS ORIGINS AND INTERPRETATION (1949); THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE CONVEN-
TION: A COMMENTARY (1960); J. Graven, Les Crimes Contre L'Humanitd, 76 R.C.A.D.I. 433
(1950); G. Levasseur, The Prevention of Genocide, 7 J. INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS 74 (1966).
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flicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures to prevent
births within the group, and forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.1 19
According to the Convention, all individuals must refuse to partici-
pate in genocide since they are subject to criminal liability under Article
VI which states:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in
Article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international pe-
nal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting
Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 120
Because individuals are personally responsible for their actions,
under the Nuremberg principles,1 ' in the case of genocide, an individual
must not only be allowed to refuse to participate, but he has a positive
duty to refrain from participating in activities constituting genocide.122
The Genocide Convention therefore reinforces the significance of individ-
ual conscience as regards military service.123
7. Apartheid
Under International law, it is a crime to participate in apartheid.
Article 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Apartheid 24 states that "apartheid is a crime
against humanity" and that the "inhuman acts resulting from the policies
and practices of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial dis-
crimination . . . are crimes violating the principles of international
law ..... ,1 25 Article 1 also stipulates that the parties to the Convention
"declare criminal those organizations, institutions and individuals com-
mitting the crime of apartheid."' 26
Therefore, as in the case of genocide, individuals have not only a
right, but a duty, to refuse to participate in the crime of apartheid. This
view is reinforced by General Assembly resolution 33/165 which pro-
vides that all persons must refuse service in military forces which are
119 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, supra note 116, art. III.
120 Id art. VI.
121 See generally THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR, supra note 24, at 57; Lawrence,
supra note 104.
122 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3, at 6.
123 See Lynn Berat, Conscientious Objection in South Africa: Governmental Paranoia and the
Law of Conscription, 22 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 127, 175 (1989).
124 Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244 (entered into force July 18, 1976).
125 Id. art. 1.
126 Id art. 1.
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used to enforce apartheid. 127
8. The Right to Self-Determination
In Article 1, paragraph 2, and in Article 55 of the United Nations
Charter references are made to "the principle of equal fights and self-
determination of peoples." 128 The principle of self-determination as de-
fined in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples,129 is viewed as emanating from the obligations set
forth in the Charter. Further, in the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law relating to Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 13 0 the Gen-
eral Assembly provides that:
[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and
freedom and independence.13 1
These principles can be invoked by an objector to argue that he must
refuse to participate in any action that tends or would tend to deprive
people of their right to self-determination.
9. Life in Peace
The United Nations has also affirmed the right of man to live in
peace. In the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in
Peace, 132 Principle 1 provides:
Every nation and every human being, regardless of race, conscience,
language or sex, has the inherent right to life in peace. Respect for that
right, as well as for other human rights, is in the common interests of
all mankind and an indispensable condition of advancement of all na-
tions, large and small, in all fields. 133
Furthermore, the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, reaffirms
the right to peace and declares that "the preservation of the right of peo-
ples to peace and the promotion of its implementation constitute a funda-
mental obligation of each State."'134
127 G.A. Res. 33/165, supra note 35.
128 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 2 & art. 55.
129 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 98.
130 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
131 Id.
132 G.A. Res. 33/73, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1979).
133 Id.
134 G.A. Res. 39/11, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 220, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1985).
Vol. 24:349
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
These Declarations can be advanced in order to support a right to
conscientiously object to military service by arguing that since a person
has a right to live in peace, he must be allowed to decide not to partici-
pate in war.
B. Religious Perspectives
The question of whether individuals should have the right to consci-
entiously object to military service has been debated for a number of
years by religious organizations. These organizations have, in a series of
worldwide conferences, by and large, endorsed the right to conscientious
objection. Some of the recommendations of these organizations will now
be examined, for they illustrate a pattern of acceptance toward the right
to conscientiously object.
In 1970, the World Conference on Religion and Peace (which in-
cluded representatives from ten religions) issued a statement entitled the
"Rights of Conscientious Objectors," which declared:
We consider that the exercise of conscientious judgment is inherent in
the dignity of human beings and that, accordingly each person should
be assured the right, on grounds of conscience on profound conviction,
to refuse military service, or any other direct or indirect participation
in wars or armed conflicts. The right of conscientious objection also
extends to those who are unwilling to serve in a particular war because
they consider it unjust or because they refuse to participate in a war or
conflict in which weapons of mass destruction are likely to be used. 135
The Committee on Society, Development and Peace (SODEPAX) also
issued a proclamation in 1970 (the Baden Consultation) which
concluded:
29. The consultation considers that the exercise of conscientious
judgment is inherent in the dignity of human beings and that accord-
ingly, each person should be assured the right, on grounds of con-
science or profound conviction, to refuse military service, or any other
direct or indirect participation in wars or armed conflicts.
30. The right of conscientious objection also extends to those who are
unwilling to serve in a particular war because they consider it unjust or
because they refuse to participate in a war or conflict in which weapons
of mass destruction are likely to be used.
31. The consultation also considers that members of armed forces
have the right and even the duty, to refuse to obey military orders
which may involve the commission of criminal offenses, or of war
crimes of crimes against humanity.
32. It is urged that the churches should use their best endeavor to
135 RELIGION FOR PEACE 183 (Homer A. Jack ed., 1973) (proceedings of the Kyoto Confer-
ence on Religion and Peace, Japan, October 1970).
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secure the recognition of the right of conscientious objection as herein
before defined under national and international law. Governments
should extend the right of asylum to those refusing to serve in their
country for reasons of conscience.
136
In 1974, the World Conference on Religion and Peace reaffirmed its
commitment to the rights of conscientious objectors when it stated:
We reaffirm the assertion of the Kyoto Conference of the right to con-
scientious objection to military service. We urge religious organiza-
tions to continue their work for the recognition of conscientious
objection by the international community through the U.N.
Governments which have not yet recognized the right of conscientious
objections, should be persuaded to do so, and make [available] alterna-
tive forms of humanitarian service. They should grant suitable amnes-
ties to those who have come into conflict with the law in asserting this
right. Religious organizations should also seek to open creative ave-
nues of work in reconciliation, peace-making, and development as al-
ternative forms of service for those who reject all compulsory state
service. 1
37
And in 1979, the Third World Conference on Religion and Peace also
recognized the need to protect conscientious objectors by stating in the
Princeton Declaration:
We uphold the right of citizens to conscientious objection to military
service. 
138
(b) Commission findings No. 19 on religion and human dignity, re-
sponsibility and rights:
We urge all governments to consider peaceful alternatives to com-
pulsory military service.13 9
What can be gleaned from these declarations is a global commit-
ment to the idea of conscientious objection. Of further importance is the
fact that the declarations support not only the rights of pacifists to object
to participation in war, but also the rights of partial conscientious
objectors. 14
136 COMMITTEE ON SOCIETY, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE, PEACE - THE DESPERATE IMPER-
ATIVE 57-58 (1970).
137 Homer A. Jack, Commission III on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in WORLD
RELIGION/WORLD PEACE 44, 46-47 (Homer A. Jack ed., 1974) (proceedings of the Second World
Conference on Religion and Peace, Belgium, August 1974).
138 Homer A. Jack, The Princeton Declaration, in RELIGION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD
COMMUNITY i, v (Homer A. Jack ed., 1980) (proceedings of the Third World Conference on Reli-
gion and Peace, Princeton, New Jersey 1979).
139 Id. at 117.
140 See, e.g., OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE FOURTH ASSEMBLY OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF
CHURCHES (Norman Goodall ed., 1968).
Protection of conscience demands that the churches should give spiritual care and support
not only to those serving in armed forces but also to those who, especially in the light of the
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C. Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by International Organizations
1. The United Nations
The issue of conscientious objection to military service was dis-
cussed in the United Nations as early as 1950,141 when the Secretary-
General of the U.N. circulated a statement that documented the legisla-
tive and administrative provisions of thirty-four countries regarding con-
scientious objection. 42 It was only in 1956, however, in the Study of
Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices,43 that the
issue was considered by the United Nations. The Study concluded that:
[a]s a rule, it may be stated that where the principle of conscientious
objection to military service is recognized, exemptions should be
granted to genuine objectors in a manner ensuring that no adverse dis-
tinction based upon religion or belief may result.144
In 1965, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Pro-
motion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Under-
standing between Peoples. a14  In Principle 1 of the Declaration it was
declared:
Young people shall be brought up in the spirit of peace, justice, free-
dom, mutual respect and understanding in order to promote equal
right for all human beings and all nations, economic and social pro-
gress, disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and
security.
14 6
Although this Declaration did not specifically address the issue of consci-
entious objection, it established the notion that individuals must be
brought up in a society that respects peace and personal conscience. 147
nature of modem warfare, object to participation in particular wars they feel bound in
conscience to oppose, or who find themselves unable to bear arms or to enter the military
service of their nations for reasons of conscience. Such support should include pressure to
have the law changed when this is required, and be extended to all in moral perplexity
about scientific work on weapons of mass destruction.
Id. at 14.
141 See generally Jonathan M. Engram, Conscientious Objection to Military Service: A Report to
the United Nations Division of Human Rights, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359 (1982).
142 Statement by Service Civil International U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/NGO/l Add. 1 (1950).
143 Arcott Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Prac-
tices, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev. 1 (1960), reprinted in 11 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 227
(1978). It should be noted that the Study devoted only two pages to the issue of conscientious
objection. Id. at 258-259.
144 Id. at 259.
145 G.A. Res. 2037, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
146 Id. Principle 1.
147 See also Education of Youth in the Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, G.A. Res. 2447, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968); International Youth Year Participation, Development, Peace, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
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It was, however, only at its 27th session that the Commission on
Human Rights truly considered and debated the issue of conscientious
objection to military service. This was done in the context of the Com-
mission's agenda item entitled "Study of the Question of the Education
of Young People all over the World for the Development of its Personal-
ity and Strengthening of its Respect for the Rights of Man and Funda-
mental Freedoms." '148
The next step in the debate over the right to conscientiously object
to military service occurred in the General Assembly. The General As-
sembly first recognized a restricted right to conscientious objection in a
resolution which affirmed "the right of all persons to refuse service in
military or police forces which are used to enforce apartheid." 49 It
called upon member states to grant asylum or safe transit to another
state, in the spirit of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, to persons
compelled to leave their country of nationality because of a conscientious
objection to assisting in the enforcement of apartheid through service in
military or police forces. 150 It urged member states to consider favorably
the granting to such persons of all the rights and benefits accorded to
refugees under existing legal instruments and it called upon the appropri-
ate United Nations bodies to provide the necessary assistance to such
persons.15'
In a further resolution, the General Assembly once again dealt with
the issue of conscientious objection and apartheid when it appealed to the
youth of South Africa to refrain from enlisting in the South African
Comm., 37 Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982). In 1974, the General Confer-
ence of UNESCO also adopted a recommendation concerning education for international under-
standing, co-operation and peace and education relating to human rights. See 1 UNESCO, Records
of the Eighteenth Session of the General Conference, Paris, 1974, Resolutions, at 148-49 (Principle
6). And in 1980 during UNESCO's World Conference on Disarmament Education, the following
principle was set out:
As an approach to international peace and security, disarmament education should take
due account of the principles of international law based on the Charter of the United Na-
tions, in particular, the refraining from the threat of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in
domestic affairs and self-determination of peoples. It should draw upon the international
law of human rights and international humanitarian law applicable in time of armed con-
flict and consider alternative approaches to security, including such non-military defence
systems as non-violent civilian action. The study of the United Nations efforts, of non
violent conflict resolution and other means of controlling international violence take on a
special importance in that regard. Due attention should be accorded in programs of dis-
armament education to the right of conscientious objection and the right to refuse to kill.
See RELIGION FOR PEACE, supra note 135, at 183.
148 At this writing the Commission on Human Rights continues to debate the issue.
149 G.A. Res. 33/165, U.N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 154, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1978).
150 Id.
151 Id.
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armed forces, "which are designed to defend the inhuman system of
apartheid, to repress the legitimate struggle of the oppressed people and
to threaten, and commit acts of aggression against, neighboring
States."152 The Assembly also invited all Governments and organiza-
tions to assist, in accordance with the resolution, persons compelled to
leave South Africa because of a conscientious objection to assisting in the
enforcement of apartheid through service in military or police forces." 3
Then in 1981, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
requested that the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities prepare a report on the question of consci-
entious objection to military service.154 After a thorough study of the
matter, the authors of the report made a series of recommendations to
the Commission. 5 One of those recommendations was that there be
recognition of the principle of conscientious objection. The report stated
in Article 1 that:
(a) States should recognize by law the right of persons who, for rea-
sons of conscience or profound conviction arising from religious,
ethical, moral, humanitarian or similar motives, refuse to perform
armed service, to be released from the obligation to perform mili-
tary service.
(b) States should, as a minimum, extend the right of objection to per-
sons whose conscience forbids them to take part in armed service
under any circumstances (the pacifist position).
(c) States should recognize by law the right to be released from service
in armed forces which the objector considers likely to be used to
enforce apartheid.
(d) States should recognize by law the right to be released from service
in armed forces which the objector considers likely to be used in
action amounting to or approaching genocide.
(e) States should recognize by law the right to be released from service
in armed forces which the objector considers likely to be used for
illegal occupation of foreign territory.
(f) States should recognize the right of persons to be released from
service in armed forces which the objector holds to be engaged in,
or likely to be engaged in, gross violations of human rights.
(g) States should recognize the right of persons to be released from the
obligation to perform service in armed forces which the objector
considers likely to resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction
or weapons which have been specifically outlawed by international
law or to use means and methods which cause unnecessary
152 G.A. Res. 34/93 A of 1979.
153 Id. This appeal was repeated in G.A. Res. 35/206 B, 35 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 48) at
30, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
154 E.S.C. Res. 40 (XXXVII), 37 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 243, U.N. Doc. E/1981/25;
E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
155 Conscientious Objection, supra note 3.
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suffering. 156
This report was followed in 1987 and 1989 with two resolutions by
the Commission on Human Rights. In resolutions 1987/46157 and
1989/59,158 the Commission recognized the right of conscientious objec-
tion. In its 1987 resolution the Commission appealed to states to "recog-
nize that conscientious objection to military service should be considered
a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."' 159 The 1989
resolution, stated that the Commission:
Recognizing that conscientious objection to military service derives
from principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convic-
tions, arising from religious or similar motives,
1. Recognizes the right of everyone to have conscientious objections
to military service as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion as laid down in article 18 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights as well as article 18 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
2. Appeals to States to enact legislation and to take measures aimed
at exemption from military service on the basis of a genuinely held
conscientious objection to armed service;
3. Recommends to States with a system of compulsory military ser-
vice, where such provision has not already been made, that they intro-
duce for conscientious objectors various forms of alternative service
which are compatible with the reasons for conscientious objection,
bearing in mind the experience of some States in this respect, and that
they refrain from subjecting such persons to imprisonment;
4. Emphasizes that such forms of alternative service should be in
principle of a non-combattant or civilian character, in the public inter-
est and not of a punitive nature;
5. Recommends to States Members of the United Nations, if they
have not already done so, that they establish within the framework of
their national legal system independent and impartial decision-making
bodies with the task of determining whether a conscientious objection
is valid in a specific case;' 6°
The main difference between the 1987 and 1989 resolutions is that
while in 1987 the Commission appealed to member states to recognize
the right of conscientious objection, in 1989 the Commission itself recog-
156 Id. at 18.
157 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1987/46, supra note 37.
158 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, supra note 49.
159 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1987/46, supra note 37.
160 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, supra note 49.
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nized the right of conscientious objection to military service. Although
this is a welcome change, problems still remain with the drafting of the
1989 resolution. The main difficulty is that the resolution does not di-
rectly address the issue of partial objectors. Despite the fact that the
resolution stipulates that objection to military service can be derived
from "principles and reasons of conscience, including profound convic-
tions, arising from religious or similar motives,"'' it does not specifically
refer to the partial objector. Therefore, the position of the Commission
on Human Rights as regards the right to partial objection remains
unclear.
2. Council of Europe
The Council of Europe has dealt with the question of the right to
conscientious objection to military service in two resolutions. In 1967,
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution
337 "on the right of conscientious objection," '162 which was subsequently
presented to the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers in Recom-
mendation 478.163 In 1987 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe reaffirmed its commitment to the right of conscientious objection
by adopting Recommendation R(87)8. t64 The 1987 Recommendation
provides:
... Noting that in the majority of member States of the Council of
Europe military service is a basic obligation of citizens;
Considering the problems raised by conscientious objection to compul-
sory military service;
Wishing that conscientious objection to compulsory military services
161 IdL
162 See Amnesty International, Special Action for Conscientious Objectors in Western Europe,
Circular 2, 1979, at 3. Resolution 337 states:
The Assembly,
Having regard to article 9, of the European Convention on Human Rights, which binds
member states to respect the individual's freedom of conscience and religion,
Declares:
A. Basic Principles
1. Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or
profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or
similar motives, refuse to perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released
from the obligation to perform such service.
2. This right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the fundamental rights of the
individual in democratic Rule of Law States which are guaranteed in Article 9 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights.
163 Id.
164 Supra, note 37, at 19.
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be recognized in all the member States of the Council of Europe and
governed by common principles;
Noting that, in some member States where conscientious objection to
compulsory military service is not yet recognized, specific measures
have been taken with a view to improving the situation of the individ-
ual concerned;
Recommends that the government of member States, in so far as they
have not already done so, bring their national law and practice into
line with the following principles and rules:
A. Basic Principles
1. Anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compel-
ling reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms,
shall have the right to be released from the obligation to perform such
service, on the conditions set out hereafter. Such persons may be liable
to perform alternative service; ... 165
In essence, these resolutions affirm that anyone who is liable to con-
scription for military service who, for compelling reasons of conscience,
refuses to be involved in war, shall have the right to be released from the
obligation to perform such service. The problem with the resolutions,
however, as was mentioned earlier, is that they do not recognize the right
to partial objection to military service.
V. CONCLUSION
After a brief examination of the documents that recognize and grant
a right of objection, and a review of the standards on which such a right
can be based, we are left with the question that was previously formu-
lated, that is: Should the right to conscientiously object to military ser-
vice be regarded as a human right?
Many tests or criteria have been proposed in order to determine
whether a given claim qualifies as a human right. Alston, for example,
advances that, at a minimum the proposed new human right should:
reflect a fundamentally important social value; be relevant, inevitably
to varying degrees, throughout a world of diverse value systems; be
eligible for recognition on the grounds that it is an interpretation of
UN Charter obligations, a reflection of customary law rules or a for-
mulation that is declaratory of general principles of law; be consistent
with, but not merely repetitive of, the existing body of international
human rights law; be capable of achieving a very high degree of inter-
national consensus; be compatible or at least not clearly incompatible
with the general practice of states; and be sufficiently precise as to give
rise to identifiable rights and obligations.
166
165 Id.
166 Alston, supra note 5, at 615.
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When these criteria are applied to the issue of conscientious objection, it
becomes evident that a right of objection could qualify as a human right
in terms of international law.
As argued, the right to conscientiously object to military service ad-
vances important social values, is relevant throughout the world and con-
sistent with the existing body of international human rights law which
seeks to protect freedom of conscience and the rights of individuals to
live in peace. The right has achieved a certain degree of international
consensus and is compatible with the practice of many states. 167 As de-
fined in the various resolutions, it is sufficiently precise to give rise to
identifiable rights and obligations.
Further, the right to conscientious objection can be viewed as an
interpretation of U.N. Charter obligations. Resolution 1989/59 specifi-
cally refers to the U.N. Charter and the right to freedom of thought and
religion guaranteed in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.1 68
In addition to the list of reasons for recognizing the right to consci-
entiously object to military service as a human right, many resolutions
have already made it clear that conscientious objection qualifies as a
human right. The General Assembly in resolution 33/165 recognized
the right "to refuse service in military or police forces which are used to
enforce apartheid."' 169 Secondly, the Commission on Human Rights in
resolutions 1987/46 and 1989/59 recognized that everyone has the right
to "have conscientious objections to military service as a legitimate exer-
cise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." 170 And
finally, the Council of Europe, in two recommendations, considered that
"anyone liable to conscription for military service who, for compelling
reasons of conscience, refuses to be involved in the use of arms, shall
have the right to be released from the obligation to perform such
"1171service....
These resolutions fulfill a number of the criteria to be considered
rules of international law. Since the resolutions of the General Assembly
specifically refer to the Charter of the United Nations, they are an au-
thoritative interpretation of the provisions of the Charter. 172 The Inter-
167 See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 16; Conscientious Objection, supra note 3.
168 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, supra note 49.
169 G.A. Res. 33/165, supra note 149.
170 Hum. Rts. Comm. Res 1987/46, supra note 37. Hum. Rts. Comm. Res. 1989/59, supra
note 49.
171 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS, REsOLUTIONS AND DECLA-
RATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37 (empha-
sis added).
172 Id. See also Robert E. Riggs, The United Nations and the Development of International
Law, 1985 B.Y.U.L. REv. 411, 429-437 (1985)
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national Law Commission has also stated that reference can be made to
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Economic and So-
cial Council to prove the existence of obligations with respect to human
rights. 173 Reference must also be made to the different standards dis-
cussed above which implicitly recognize the right to conscientious
objection.
In light of all these facts, it is proposed that conscientious objection
to military service is a basic human right. The problem, however, re-
mains that such a right has never been explicitly codified in a major
human rights instrument. Since resolutions are not considered as "full-
fledged" rules of international law' 74 and since they need further elabora-
tion and adaptation by states in order to become operative, it is impera-
tive that the major human rights instruments be amended to include the
right of conscientious objection to military service.
173 Id.
174 See, Riggs, supra note 172.
The U.N. Charter... establishes beyond doubt that assembly resolutions were intended to
be only hortatory in nature. . .. [T]his understanding has been repeatedly confirmed in
statements by member states, and it has been implicitly affirmed by the practice of follow-
ing up certain declarations with a treaty drafting process when legally binding effects are
intended.
Id. at 435.
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